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helpful comments.The desire to move the economy toward high employment without inflation has
led economists to search for new tools beyond the traditional instruments of
monetary and fiscal policy. While monetary and fiscal policy can control
aggregate demand, additional instruments may be required if aggregate nominal
demand management is not enough to solve macroeconomic problems. Some of these
proposed tools affect macroeconomic outcomes by changing microeconomic
incentives. One such instrument is the macroeconomic market incentive plan (MAP,
or Market Anti-Inflation Plan), introduced by Lerner and Colander (1980).
Since these proposals change microeconomic incentives, they have both
microeconomic and macroeconomic implications. While the relationship between
microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic outcomes has been on the research agenda
for more than two decades, wide disagreement continues. This has made it
difficult to reach firm conclusions regarding the viability of proposals like
MAP, but it also means that questions raised by the study of MAP have important
implications for macroeconomic theory.
I. History
MAP is neither the first nor the latest tool that has been proposed to
supplement monetary and fiscal policy. Historically, the most common policy is
a form of wage and price control. Unfortunately, the experience with suchcontrols has been spotty. The most recent experience in the United States with
direct controls occurred during Nixon's presidency. These controls produced
shortages in some sectors of the economy, and inflation "bounced back" forcefully
after the controls were lifted.
Problems with wage and price controls have encouraged the search for
alternatives. In the early 1970's Wallich and Weintraub (1971) proposed a tax-
based incomes policy (TIP). Their basic idea was to increase tax rates on
corporate profits whenever increases in a firm's average wages exceeded an
announced guideline. With TIP, firms are discouraged but not prohibited from
raising wages. If a business wishes to expand rapidly, it can raise wages to
attract new workers but must also pay the higher taxes.
Many variations on TIP are possible. For example, other taxes may be
adjusted, or price rather than wage changes could be taxed. Still, all TIP
proposals have the same general objective of discouraging inflation while
providing firms with more flexibility to adjust relative prices than under wage
and price controls. The result should be that shortages are less likely under
TIP than under wage and price controls. This increases the likelihood that a TIP
program can be sustained over a longer period of time and reduces the immediate
threat of a "bounce back" of inflation.
The Carter administration considered a TIP program, but no formal proposal
was ever made. A 1978 Brookings Conference (Okun and Perry 1978) considered the
administrative and political problems of a variety of TIP proposals. Recently
TIP programs have been used in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to limit wage
increases during the reforms. In the Soviet Union TIP has not been very
effective in controlling the wage bill since the law has not been enforced and
enterprises operate under soft budget constraints (A Study of the Soviet Economy,
2Vol 2, p. 183). In Poland, with a tax rate of 500X, few, if any, wage increases
have occurred. The policy more closely resembles wage and price controls than
a flexible policy of wage adjustment.
Recently, an alternative "Share Economy" approach has been proposed by
Weitzman (1984, 1985). Share Economy workers would receive part of their income
as profit shares rather than fixed wage payments. This lowers the marginal cost
of hiring additional workers and provides an incentive for firms to expand
employment. Weitzman argues that the unemployment problem can be solved in this
way. This gives policy-makers more freedom to control inflation by adjusting
aggregate demand.
Although there are no real world examples of explicit attempts to
establish a Share Economy, the British government has established tax breaks that
encourage profit sharing arrangements. Weitzman has also studied how closely his
scheme resembles bonus payments in Japan and whether the stability of the
Japanese economy is due to these arrangements.
Of these proposals MAP is closest to TIP. Instead of taxing wage or price
increases, MAP establishes a tradable permit system. Under one version of MAP,
a firm could not raise its price unless it purchased a permit. This permit
could be purchased from another firm which creates price increase credits by
lowering the price of its output. Since
another firm lowers its price by the same
remain constant.
MAP and TIP are both anti-inflation
to adjust. MAP makes it more costly for a
added incentive to lower prices. For the
policies which allow relative prices
firm to raise prices, and there is an
firm facing a downward-sloping demand
curve, MAP has the same effect as rotating the demand curve around the existing
a firm could raise its price only if
amount, the overall price level will
3quantity point so the curve appears flatter. In this way MAP creates a bias
towards lower price levels.
II. Theoretical Analysis of MAP
The imposition of MAP can be viewed as a redefinition of the property right
to adjust prices. Without MAP the right to adjust prices lies with price setters
and is circumscribed by the competitiveness of the market. With MAP firms still
must contend with the market, but they must also purchase tradable permits.  In
a number of respects these property rights issues parallel those that arise in
pollution control. For both pollution control and inflation control, taxes and
tradable permits have been recommended as alternative means of controlling
externalities due to high transactions costs. The property rights perspective
is different from the standard approach to macroeconomic questions and raises
fundamental questions that go beyond the analysis of MAP itself.'
The theoretical justification for intervention by government to control
pollution is the existence of an externality. In the absence of government
action, the cost of negotiating among the parties creating the pollution and the
parties affected by the pollution is too great for trade to occur. Either
pollution taxes or pollution permits can be used to reduce the amount of
pollution. Taxes reduce the amount but do not determine the quantity; permits
determine the quantity and let the price be determined in the market. Like
pollution taxes, TIP can discourage firms from raising prices, but cannot
directly control the level of inflation. If tax rates are too low, inflation may
proceed at high rates. If the tax is too high, as in Poland, no price changes
will occur. TIP will function as wage and price controls and shortages can
arise. Like marketable pollution permits, MAP can control the level of
4inflation. The price of MAP credits is a charge for raising the price.
Externality arguments similar to those involving pollution have been used
to justify MAP. Coordination failures due to macroeconomic externalities have
been analyzed (Cooper and John, 1988) and linked to MAP programs (Colander,
Koford and Miller, 1989). Still, many questions have not been fully explored.
Because MAP is a system which changes the price setting incentives of individual
firms, understanding the impact of MAP requires a model which explains the
relationship between the microeconomic behavior of firms and their macroeconomic
economic consequences. Furthermore, an important aspect of MAP is that it should
give firms the freedom to adjust relative prices so that shortages do not arise
as they do under wage and price controls. Representative agent models are
inadequate for answering this type of question.'
Formal analysis of macroeconomic externalities is recent - Cooper and
John's being an early contribution. As Coase (1960) argued, however,
externalities are related to transactions costs, and transactions costs have been
studied much longer in macroeconomics than externalities per se. Transactions
costs have been used to justify the existence of money, and even though explicit
reference is not always made to transactions costs, arguments relying on search
costs, contract adjustment costs or related imperfections in markets incorporate
a form of transactions costs into their models. In the absence of a unifying
theory of how these transactions costs relate to each other, we are left with
many models ( e.g., for wage setting behavior) and must search for ways to choose
among them (Blinder, 1991).
Transactions costs are part of the resource costs of operating the market
economy just as the organizational costs of a large hierarchy arz costs in a
centrally planned system. Resources devoted to these framework fucctions  under
5either form of economic organization are resources not available for the
production of goods and services.3 A model broader than the no-transaction-
costs general-equilibrium model would analyze these trade-offs. Altering
institutional arrangements in a number of ways such as restructuring the legal
system or the financial payments system might lead to more efficient market
arrangements.4 So inflation reduction is only one way that resources used to
support framework functions might be released to the production sector of the
economy.
Frameworks within which markets operate may not be properly chosen. It is
not clear that markets can always be used to properly allocate the resources
necessary to perform these functions. Still, this is what MAP proposes to do.
Pollution permits put a price on the opportunity cost not accounted for in the
production process. MAP does the same by putting a price on the additional
resource costs due to an inflationary environment. Whether the tradable permits
are used to constrain pollution or inflation, the government determines the
"quantity". In neither case is this likely to be the optimal amount. In both
cases, however, some kind of intervention may be justified; otherwise individual
decisions will be made on the basis of private costs in a situation where private
costs and social costs differ.
The theoretical justification for MAP is that there is a macroeconomic
externality, and MAP can mitigate the consequences of the externality. More work
needs to be done to define the nature of this externality before a clear picture
will evolve. This requires a deeper understanding of transaction costs and a
model that integrates such costs into microeconomic and macroeconomic models.III. Costs of a MAP Proqram
MAP creates additional costs for both government and firms. To evaluate
MAP these costs should be compared to the costs of utilizing alternative policy
instruments.
As with any market, new markets in MAP credits are not costless. First,
if MAP permits are to be traded, units must be measured with some accuracy.
Similar problems arise in markets for pollution permits. Secondly, there must
be enforcement. If a firm sells a permit, what is to prevent this firm from
raising its price as much as it desires unless there is monitoring of the firm's
activities? Whether the permits are issued in a market for pollution or a market
for price increases, these costs are significant. Yet last summer trading began
in a market for pollution rights.
Government expense is not the only cost of administering a MAP program.
Firms must bear the cost of participation in a market for MAP credits rather than
simply adjust prices. On the other hand, if MAP successfully prevents price
inflation, transactions costs would be lower. Money reduces transactions most
when the price level is known and stable. As a unit of account, money makes it
easier for economic agents to determine relative values. As a store of value,
money enables agents to carry purchasing power forward from one period to the
next. In an inflationary environment, money performs neither of these functions
well. Inflation raises the cost of transactions, and distorts economic
decisions. Without an accurate unit of account it is difficult to measure the
aggregate losses from misallocation of resources due to misjudgments of relative
prices.
Even if MAP can stop inflation, it is not the only means of doing so. What
should be shown is a direct link between the change in price adjustment property
7rights under MAP and the externalities caused by the increased transactions costs
arising in an inflationary environment.5 The difficulty is that our
understanding of the relationship between transaction costs and production costs
is still primitive. This makes it difficult to formally model the relationship
between MAP and the increase in transactions costs caused by inflation.
A more appropriate question than optimality is whether the MAP system is
a move in the right direction. Transaction costs due to inflation must be
reduced by more than the costs of operating MAP itself, and the misallocation of
resources must be less under MAP. It is generally conceded that wage and price
controls distort relative prices and cause misallocation of resources. To the
extent that MAP distorts relative price movements, misallocation could also
occur.' Against this must be weighed the misallocation which occurs under
inflation. When the price level is rising, relative prices become distorted.
Different mechanisms are used to adjust prices in different parts of the economy.
At any point in time some prices are rising more rapidly than others. Relative
prices reflect not only the pull of supply and demand, but also how these price
setting mechanisms adjust for inflation. Allocation decisions made on the basis
of these prices are distorted.' At high levels of inflation the price setting
mechanisms themselves change to cope with the high-inflation environment. This
further adds to the costs that MAP is designed to offset.
Traditionally, methods other than MAP have been used to control inflation.
Contractionary monetary and fiscal policy have succeeded in reducing inflation
in the United States, but the costs have been high. To be effective, MAP must
be coordinated with monetary and fiscal policy. The price of MAP credits is a
signal of demand pressure in the economy. If this pressure becomes too great the
price of MAP credits will go to 100% of the increase in price, and MAP will
8become a rigid price control. Thus, a cost effective MAP program will
complement rather than replace other stabilization instruments.
IV. Conclusion
Theoretical analysis of MAP highlights macroeconomic questions that have
broad relevance. Since MAP is designed to fight macroeconomic inflation by
changing the incentives of individual price setters, the relationship between
microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic outcomes must be squarely faced. If MAP
redefines property rights in order to manage the problems created by a
macroeconomic externality, this externality must be clearly defined. This
macroeconomic externality must be related to transactions costs in the economy.
Then it must be shown how these transactions costs change when inflation rises.
For MAP to be well understood, economists must learn more about the effects of
aggregate demand pressure on microeconomic price setting behavior and
transactions costs, and how in turn these changes affect the macroeconomy.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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111. It is close to the "New Keynesian" approach described by Stiglitz (1991).
Stiglitz focuses on how market failure can cause business cycles. Here our focus
is how alternative policy tools can be used to fight inflation.
2. See Stiglitz (1991) for an argument for why representative agent models are
inadequate to explore a wider set of questions as well.
3. How these functions are counted in our measures of aggregate output depends
on the circumstances. If inflation makes it more difficult for a consumer to
determine which price is lowest, the added search costs are not included in GNP.
But if a firm hires an additional buyer, these costs are added to GNP.
4.Williamson  (1985) discusses how institutional changes can affect transactions
costs within and between firms.
5. This is equivalent to the argument that pollution arises because a resource
is underpriced. A tradable pollution permit system creates an appropriate charge
for this resource.
6. As noted above, MAP reduces
demand curve flatter. Thus, MAP
due to imperfect competition.
firms' market power by making their apparent
should reduce relative price distortion that is
7. It has been argued that income distributions are distorted by inflation.
While relative incomes should change when supply and demand shifts, distribu-
tional shifts caused by inflation are considered arbitrary. If inflation causes
arbitrary distributional shifts, it must also cause relative price distortion.
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